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While it is well established that individuals with psychopathy have a marked deficit
in affective arousal, emotional empathy, and caring for the well-being of others, the
extent to which perspective taking can elicit an emotional response has not yet been
studied despite its potential application in rehabilitation. In healthy individuals, affective
perspective taking has proven to be an effective means to elicit empathy and concern
for others. To examine neural responses in individuals who vary in psychopathy during
affective perspective taking, 121 incarcerated males, classified as high (n = 37; Hare
psychopathy checklist-revised, PCL-R ≥ 30), intermediate (n = 44; PCL-R between 21 and
29), and low (n = 40; PCL-R ≤ 20) psychopaths, were scanned while viewing stimuli
depicting bodily injuries and adopting an imagine-self and an imagine-other perspective.
During the imagine-self perspective, participants with high psychopathy showed a typical
response within the network involved in empathy for pain, including the anterior insula
(aINS), anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), supplementary motor area (SMA), inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), somatosensory cortex, and right amygdala. Conversely, during the
imagine-other perspective, psychopaths exhibited an atypical pattern of brain activation
and effective connectivity seeded in the anterior insula and amygdala with the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The response in the amygdala
and insula was inversely correlated with PCL-R Factor 1 (interpersonal/affective) during the
imagine-other perspective. In high psychopaths, scores on PCL-R Factor 1 predicted the
neural response in ventral striatum when imagining others in pain. These patterns of brain
activation and effective connectivity associated with differential perspective-taking provide
a better understanding of empathy dysfunction in psychopathy, and have the potential to
inform intervention programs for this complex clinical problem.
Keywords: amygdala, effective connectivity, empathy, insula, orbitofrontal cortex, perspective taking,
psychopathy, ventral striatum
Empathy, the social-emotional response that is induced by the
perception of another person’s affective state, is a fundamen-
tal component of emotional experience, and plays a vital role
in social interaction (Szalavitz and Perry, 2010). It is thought
to be a proxy for prosocial behavior, guiding our social prefer-
ences and providing the affective and motivational base for moral
development. Empathy is a deeply fundamental component of
healthy co-existence whose absence is the hallmark of serious
social-cognitive dysfunctions. Among the various psychopatholo-
gies marked by such deficits, psychopaths are characterized by a
general lack of empathy and attenuated responding to emotional
stimuli (Blair et al., 1997; Herpertz and Sass, 2000; Hare, 2003;
Mahmut et al., 2008).
Empathy includes both cognitive and affective compo-
nents (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, 2009; Singer
and Lamm, 2009; Decety, 2011a; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012).
The empathic arousal component, or emotion contagion, devel-
ops earlier than the cognitive component, and seems to be hard-
wired in the brain with deep evolutionary roots (Decety and
Svetlova, 2012). In addition developmental research has found
that concern for others emerges prior to the second year of life. In
these studies, young children are not only moved by others’ emo-
tional states, but they make distress and pain attribution in con-
junction with their comforting behavior and recognize what the
target is distressed about (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Empathic
arousal plays a fundamental role in generating the motivation
to care and help another person in distress and depends only
minimally on mindreading and perspective-taking capacities. In
naturalistic studies, young children with high empathy disposi-
tion are more readily aroused vicariously by other’ sadness, pain
or distress, but at the same time possess greater capacities for
emotion regulation so that their own negative arousal motivates
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rather than overwhelms their desire to alleviate the other’s dis-
tress (Miller and Jansen op de Haar, 1997; Nichols et al., 2009).
Empathic arousal is a bottom-up process in which the amyg-
dala, hypothalamus, anterior insula (aINS), and orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) underlie rapid and prioritized processing of emo-
tion signals sent by others (Decety and Svetlova, 2012). The
cognitive component of empathy overlaps with the construct of
perspective taking (Ruby and Decety, 2003). Perspective taking
describes the ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of
another individual and imagine what that person is thinking or
feeling. The ability to adopt the perspective of another has pre-
viously been linked to social competence and social reasoning
(Underwood and Moore, 1982). A substantial body of behavioral
studies has documented that affective perspective taking is a pow-
erful way to elicit empathy and concern for others (Batson et al.,
1997; Decety and Hodges, 2006; Van Lange, 2008). For instance,
Oswald (1996) found that affective perspective taking is more
effective that cognitive perspective taking to evoke empathy and
altruistic helping. Functional neuroimaging studies have consis-
tently identified a circumscribed neural network reliably involved
in perspective taking, which links the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS/TPJ), and
temporal poles/amygdala (Ruby and Decety, 2003, 2004; Hynes
et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2006; Vollm et al., 2006; Rameson
et al., 2011). Lesion studies have shown that affective perspective
taking depends on intact medial and ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) as well as regions in the posterior temporo-parietal
cortex (Rankin et al., 2006). Importantly, neurological patients
with damage to the vmPFC are found to exhibit a specific impair-
ment in affective theory of mind tasks, sparing their cognitive
empathy ability (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006).
In the empathy literature, a number of behavioral studies have
documented a distinction between an imagine-self perspective
and an imagine-other perspective (Batson, 2011). When adopt-
ing the former perspective, the central figure is oneself and one’s
own thoughts and feelings, and increases the salience of self-
attributes. The imagining-other perspective involves an empathic
attentional set in which the individual opens himself or herself
in a deeply responsive way to the other person (Barrett-Lennard,
1981; Batson, 2009; Halpern, 2012). This distinction between
imagine-self and imagine-other perspectives is also supported by
functional neuroimaging research. For instance, when partici-
pants are asked to imagine being in physical pain themselves, they
report greater pain intensity ratings and have greater activation
in the aINS, aMCC, thalamus, and somatosensory cortex com-
pared to imagining the same pain happening to another person
(Jackson et al., 2006). The reverse contrast, imagining-other in
pain vs. imagining oneself in pain, was associated with increased
activity in the right pSTS and mPFC. Another study reported that
self-perspective compared to other-perspective, when watching
videos depicting facial expression of pain, led to higher activity
in brain areas involved in the affective response to threat or pain,
such as the amygdala, the insula, and the aMCC, as well as higher
subjective ratings of personal distress (Lamm et al., 2007).
It is well established that individuals with psychopathy have
limited aversive arousal to the distress and sadness cues of oth-
ers (Van Honk and Schutter, 2006; Blair, 2007; Anderson and
Kiehl, 2011), but spared theory of mind and cognitive perspective
taking capacities (Blair, 2005; but see Brook and Kosson, 2012).
However, it is not known if, when they adopt the affective per-
spective taking of another person, the extent to which the active
contemplation of another’s affective experience modulates brain
circuits involved in affective processing.
Building on past research on perspective taking and empa-
thy with healthy participants (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al.,
2007; Decety and Porges, 2011) as well as a recent study of pain
empathy in criminal psychopaths (Decety et al., 2013), incarcer-
ated offenders with different levels of psychopathy on Factors 1
and 2 underwent fMRI scanning while watching visual stimuli
depicting physical pain. To elicit first- or third-person perspective
taking (or imagine-self and imagine-other perspectives respec-
tively) we explicitly manipulated the task instructions given to the
participants in the scanner before each block, by asking them to
think of the situations as either occurring to them or to someone
else. Factor 1 describes a constellation of affective and interper-
sonal traits considered to be fundamental to the construct of
psychopathy, which includes shallow affect, callous and lack of
empathy, while Factor 2 reflects an unstable and antisocial lifestyle
(Hare, 2003). Based on fMRI studies that used similar instruc-
tions and stimuli with healthy participants, it was predicted that
imagine-self perspective would be associated with stronger vis-
ceromotor response in the aINS, somatosensory cortex and ACC
than imagine-other perspective taking in participants scoring low
on the psychopathy checklist-revised (PCL-R), especially Factor
1, because these regions have been associated with activation of
representations of pain and of other negative emotions (Benuzzi
et al., 2008). However, due to altered responding to affective
stimuli in psychopathy, the opposite effect was expected for indi-
viduals scoring high on psychopathy PCL-R Factor 1. When
instructed to adopt the perspective of another individual in phys-
ical pain, we hypothesized that individuals scoring high on the
PCL-R would show a pronounced deficit in aINS and vmPFC
hemodynamic response. This prediction is based on the large
body of evidence from lesion studies and neuroimaging studies
with healthy individuals as well as with psychopaths that show
the importance of these regions in affective perspective taking
and empathic concern (Rankin et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2003; Kiehl, 2006; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2011; Rameson et al., 2011;
Decety et al., 2012; Young and Dungan, 2012). The distinction
between imagine-self and imagine-other is critical, as most stud-
ies suggest that psychopaths have spared mentalizing (cognitive
empathy) abilities, and that the key deficit appears to relate to
their lack of concern about the impact of their behavior on poten-
tial victims, rather than the inability to adopt a victim-centered
perspective (Dolan and Fullam, 2004).
Finally, analyses of functional segregation can be comple-
mented by effective connectivity analyses. Whereas standard con-
trast analyses create a “snapshot” of regional brain activity in
response to a task or condition, functional connectivity anal-
yses can identify patterns of communication between regions
that contrast analyses may not detect [see Decety and Porges,
2011; Zaki et al. (2007) for such methods in empathy for pain].
Given the role of the insula in mapping internal states of bod-
ily and subjective feelings (Craig, 2002) and that of the amygdala
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in motivational salience (Cunningham and Brosch, 2012), these
two regions were selected as seeds for the functional connectivity
analyses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred twenty-four adult right-handed males between the
ages of 18 and 50, incarcerated in a medium-security North
American correctional facility, volunteered for the study and
provided informed consent to the procedures described here,
which were approved by the Institutional Review Boards of
the University of New Mexico and the University of Chicago.
Participants underwent the PCL-R assessment, including file
review and interview, conducted by trained research assistants
under the supervision of Dr. Kiehl. Three participants were
excluded for excessive movement in the scanner. Participants
scoring 30 and above on the PCL-R were assigned to the high-
psychopathy group (n = 37; age 32.5 ± 7.8; IQ 103.3 ± 13). To
create the medium- and low-psychopathy groups, two groups of
volunteers were matched to high scorers on age, race and eth-
nicity, IQ (WAIS), comorbidity for DSM-IV Axis II disorders,
and past drug abuse and dependence, from pools of incarcer-
ated volunteers scoring between 21 and 29 (n = 44; age 34.1 ± 7;
IQ 97.3 ± 12.7), and volunteers scoring below 20 on the PCL-R
(n = 40; age 34.6 ± 6.9; IQ 99.3 ± 14), respectively. Participants
were paid for their participation in the study.
EXCLUSION CRITERIA
Additional participants who volunteered for the study but met
exclusion criteria were not included. Exclusion criteria were age
younger than 18 years or older than 55, non-fluency in English,
reading level lower than 4th grade, IQ score lower than 80, history
of seizures, prior head injury with loss of consciousness> 30min,
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) Axis I diagno-
sis, lifetime history of a psychotic disorder or psychotic disorder
in a first degree relative, or current alcohol or drug use.
TASK DESIGN
Participants in the MRI scanner were instructed to adopt either
a self-perspective or an other-perspective while viewing visual
stimuli depicting right hands and right feet of individuals in
painful and non-painful situations [stimuli and procedure sim-
ilar to Jackson et al. (2006)]. All stimuli showed familiar events
that can happen in everyday life to people (e.g., pinching one’s
finger in a door, or catching one’s toe under a heavy object).
Various types (mechanical, thermal and pressure) of pain inflicted
to the limbs were depicted. Neutral pictures showed limbs in visu-
ally similar situations without pain component (e.g., a hand on
the handle of a drawer as opposed to being caught in the same
drawer). Participants viewed 120 stimuli of pain and no pain.
Each trial lasted 1.4 s and consisted of one of the pain scenar-
ios, and the inter-stimuli intervals were jittered between 2.5 and
5.4 s. Timing parameters were generated using a genetic opti-
mization algorithm (Wager and Nichols, 2003). Eye-tracking was
monitored in the scanner to ensure that participants were paying
attention to the stimuli.
PERSPECTIVE INSTRUCTIONS
Amixed block-event related fMRI design [24 blocks (12 imagine-
self and 12 imagine-other) with a total 120 trials] was employed,
in which instructions were given to the subjects at the begin-
ning of each block, i.e., for the imagine-self perspective blocks
(“Imagine that these situations are happening to you”), and for
the imaging-other perspective blocks (“Imagine that these situ-
ations are happening to someone else”). A colored border (blue
or yellow) around the stimuli was used to further cue par-
ticipants about which perspective to employ. Block order was
pseudo-randomized across participants. Painful and non-painful
scenarios were randomized within each block. Post-scan debrief-
ings were conducted to make sure that subjects did follow the
perspective-taking instructions.
MRI ACQUISITION
Scanning was conducted on a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Magnetom
Avanto mobile unit equipped with advanced SQ gradients and a
twelve element head coil. Functional images were collected using
an EPI gradient-echo pulse sequence with TR/TE = 2000/39ms,
flip angle = 90◦, field of view = 240 × 240mm, matrix = 64 ×
64 cm, in-plane resolution = 3.4 × 3.4mm, slice thickness =
5mm, and 30 slices, full-brain coverage. Task presentation was
implemented using the commercial software package E-Prime
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh PA).
High-resolution T1-weighted structural MRI scans were
acquired using a multiecho MPRAGE pulse sequence (repeti-
tion time = 2530ms, echo times = 1.64ms, 3.50ms, 5.36ms,
7.22ms, inversion time = 1100ms, flip angle = 7◦, slice thick-
ness = 1.3mm, matrix size = 256 × 256) yielding 128 sagittal
slices with an in-plane resolution of 1.0 × 1.0mm.
IMAGE PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS
Functional images were processed with SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) in Matlab
(Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA). For each participant,
functional data were realigned to the first image acquisition of
the series and re-sampled to a voxel size of 2 × 2 × 2mm3.
Structural T1 images were co-registered to the mean func-
tional image and segmented using the “New Segment” rou-
tine. A group-level structural template and individual flow
fields were created using DARTEL, and the flow fields were
in turn were used to spatially normalize functional images to
standard MNI space. Data were smoothed with an 8mm full-
width at half maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel.
Three participants were eliminated from further analysis due to
issues related to movement or image quality, leaving N = 121
(n = 40, 47, 37 for low, intermediate, and high psychopathy,
respectively).
Statistics were calculated at the first level using the general lin-
ear model. The design matrix included three regressors for each
stimulus category (detailed above), representing the event onsets
and their time and dispersion derivatives. Movement parameters
from the realignment output were included as regressors of no
interest. All participants were entered into a second-level pooled
analysis, and full brain activations were thresholded voxelwise
at p < 0.001 and with an extent threshold based on Gaussian
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random fields set to control the whole-brain family-wise error
rate (FWE) at p < 0.05.
Second-level analyses were conducted by comparing the
extremes of the sample distribution of PCL-R scores, and then as
a continuous regressor using the entire sample. Participants with
PCL-R total score at or above 30 were selected for the psychopa-
thy group, while participants scoring at 20 or below comprised
the incarcerated control group. For these analyses, regions of
interest (ROIs) were defined using the MarsBar ROI toolbox. We
focused on brain regions that were of maximal importance to the
hypotheses under investigation, informed by the existing litera-
ture on empathy for pain in particular from a meta-analysis of
32 fMRI studies of empathy for pain (Lamm et al., 2011). MNI
coordinates were selected from a previous fMRI study of empa-
thy for pain in 80 male incarcerated participants (Decety et al.,
2013). That study employed the same 1.5 mobile MRI scanner,
and exposed the participants (from a different North American
prison) to visual stimuli depicting bodily physical pain and videos
of facial expressions of pain. ROI data are reported for significant
contrast image peaks within 10mm of these a priori coordinates
(FWE-corrected p < 0.05). Beyond existing literature on the pro-
cessing of empathy-inducing stimuli in healthy populations, there
may be additional cortical or subcortical brain regions that con-
tribute to abnormal processing of these regions in psychopathy.
For instance, the ventral striatum has been found to be over-
reactive in adolescents with conduct disorder as well as sexual
sadists (Decety et al., 2009; Harenski et al., 2012). Therefore,
coordinates for the ventral striatum were selected from a recent
meta-analysis of fMRI studies (Diekhof et al., 2012).
To explore the extent to which results found in the group-
wise analysis are driven by PCL-R Factor 1, Factor 2, or both,
the regions reported above were tested for significant correlation
with PCL-R factor scores. Corresponding t-values for sub-factor
covariates within 10mm of the ROIs above, if significant, were
reported for each factor and task.
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY
Effective connectivity using psychophysiological interaction (PPI,
Gitelman et al., 2003) was used to examine the effective con-
nectivity from the anterior insula during imagine-first and
imagine-third perspective taking conditions. The right anterior
insula was selected because of its role in affective processing
and attention. This polysensory region is considered as the
integral hub of a salience network, which assists target brain
regions in the generation of appropriate behavioral responses to
salient stimuli (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Under the hypoth-
esis that high psychopathy may result from a systemic brain
deficit which is reflected in abnormal functional-connectivity pat-
terns while imagining pain, we compared effective connectivity
in imagine-self perspective and imagine-other perspective con-
ditions between low- and high-psychopathy groups. Because of
the importance of the amygdala reactivity (or the lack thereof) in
psychopathy, we also ran a similar PPI analysis seeded in the right
amygdala.
The time series of the first eigenvariates of the BOLD sig-
nal were temporally filtered, mean corrected, and deconvolved
to generate the time series of the neuronal signal for the source
region—the insula—as the physiological variable in the PPI. The
psychological variable represented the time course of the contrast
between painful and non-painful trials. An additional regressor
represented the interaction of the psychological and physiological
factors. These regressors were convolved with the canonical HRF
and entered into the regression model. The interaction term in
the resulting SPM showed areas with selective connectivity to the
insula across the psychological contrast of pain vs. no pain. The
PPI analysis was performed for each subject, and the resulting
images of contrast estimates were entered into a random-effects
group analysis. Second-level analysis results are reported at a vox-
elwise statistical cutoff of p < 0.001 and a spatial extent threshold
of k > 10 voxels.
RESULTS
The entire sample of 121 participants (regardless of their psy-
chopathy level) showed significant neuro-hemodynamic increase
in the network of regions involved in the actual experience
of physical pain under the imagine-self trials (k > 10, p <
0.05, FWE corrected). This network includes the anterior insula
(aINS), anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), supplementary
motor area (SMA), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), mPFC, and somatosensory cortex,
in both hemispheres (Table 1). In addition, signal change was
detected in the left striatum and right amygdala.
When participants adopted the imagine-other perspective, a
similar network was implicated, except for the right amygdala
(Table 2). The only additional regions activated were the pSTS
and mPFC in the right hemisphere. When imagine-other per-
spective was contrasted with imagine-self perspective, bilateral
Table 1 | Imagine-self perspective.
Region of interest MNI coordinates Peak T
x y z
L Anterior insula −34 20 2 6.59
R Anterior insula 44 14 0 5.28
L Supramarginal gyrus −58 −28 32 6.81
R Supramarginal gyrus 58 −24 34 6.86
L Supplementary motor area −4 12 60 6.38
R Supplementary motor area 6 10 60 6.35
L Anterior midcingulate cortex −6 20 38 6.12
R Anterior midcingulate cortex 4 18 40 5.29
L Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex −8 54 14 5.87
R Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 4 56 18 5.29
R Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 44 30 −4 5.69
L Inferior frontal gyrus −38 28 4 6.10
R Inferior frontal gyrus 54 12 8 5.52
L Inferior parietal lobule −44 −54 38 4.73
R Inferior temporal gyrus 46 −66 −12 5.43
R Amygdala 20 −4 −14 3.72*
Pooled group results for all participants (n = 121).
All clusters are significant at FWE-corrected p < 0.05 (cutoff, t = 4.72), except
those marked with a star, which are significant at uncorrected p < 0.0001. L, left
hemisphere; R, right hemisphere.
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Table 2 | Imagine-other perspective.
Region of interest MNI coordinates Peak T
x y z
L Anterior insula −46 6 −6 7.66
R Anterior insula 34 28 8 5.45
L Supramarginal gyrus −56 −36 36 7.21
R Supramarginal gyrus 58 −28 28 5.62
L Supplementary motor area −4 12 58 5.34
R Supplementary motor area 6 10 58 6.41
L Anterior cingulate cortex −4 24 26 5.67
L Anterior midcingulate cortex −6 14 38 6.43
R Anterior midcingulate cortex 0 −10 34 3.93*
L Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex −42 40 10 7.07
R Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 48 30 0 5.52
L Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex −8 56 26 4.72
R Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 8 54 2 4.04*
L Inferior frontal gyrus −52 8 6 10.16
R Inferior frontal gyrus 50 12 4 7.24
L Post. Superior temporal sulcus −48 −44 10 3.54*
R Post. Superior temporal sulcus 50 −36 2 5.03
L Inferior parietal lobule −44 −34 34 5.17
L Dorsal striatum −12 0 4 5.79
Pooled group results for all participants (n = 121). All clusters are significant at
FWE-corrected p < 0.05 (cutoff, t = 4.72), except those marked with a star,
which are significant at uncorrected p < 0.0001.
activation was detected in the superior parietal cortex (−23,−52,
60 and 27, −44, 59), superior frontal gyrus (−21, −7, 52 and
26, −8, 52), and dorsal striatum (−6, 4, 12 and 9, 4, 11). No
significant signal increase was detected for the reverse contrast.
REGION OF INTEREST ANALYSES
Results from the ROI analyses are presented in Table 3. When
participants with low scores on the PCL-R were compared with
individuals scoring high on the PCL-R, the mPFC (−12, 52,
8) was activated during imagine-self perspective. A cluster of
significant hemodynamic increase was found in the OFC. The
opposite contrast (high psychopathy> low psychopathy) showed
increased signal in the aMCC, SMA, right aINS, IFG, and right
pSTS/TPJ. All participants showed significant response in the
right amygdala during imagine-self perspective (Figure 1).
During the imagine-other perspective, individuals with low
scores on the PCL-R compared with individuals with high scores
on the PCL-R, showed greater signal change in the SMA, right
mPFC, intraparietal sulcus, precentral gyrus, and parahippocam-
pal gyrus/amygdala, pSTS, dorsal aINS and dorsal ACC. In
participants with high scores on the PCL-R, the imagine-other
perspective was associated with greater activation in the dlPFC
and ventral striatum (p < 0.001), when compared to low-scoring
incarcerated controls.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PCL-R SCORES AND ROIs
The hemodynamic response in the aINS was significantly greater
in individuals scoring high on psychopathy (total PCL-R score)
during imagine-self perspective, and the reverse was found for
imagine-other perspective (Figure 2). Factor 2 positively corre-
lated with the activity in aINS during imagine-self perspective
(r = 0.372, p = 0.016), whereas it negatively correlated with
aINS activity during imagine-other perspective (r = −0.254, p =
0.01). Factor 1 was negatively correlated with response in aINS
during third-person perspective (r = −0.272, p = 0.01). Activity
in the dmPFC was negatively associated with both Factor 1
(r = −0.24, p < 0.01) and Factor 2 (r = −0.237, p = 0.01) dur-
ing imagine-self perspective. The hemodynamic response in the
dlPFC was positively correlated with both Factor 1 (r = 0.288,
p < 0.01) and Factor 2 (r = 0.274, p < 0.01) during imagine-
other perspective. The response in the ventral striatum during
imagine-other perspective significantly correlated with scores on
Factor 1 (r = 0.212, p < 0.02, see Figure 3). Finally, response
in the right amygdala (26, 2, −18) showed a negative correla-
tion with Factor 1 (r = −0.258, p = 0.04) during imagine-other
perspective. No significant correlation was found in imagine-self
perspective with either Factors 1 and 2. See Table 3 for a complete
list of results.
EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY ANALYSES
Functional connectivity analyses seeded in the anterior insula
revealed distinct patterns in functional coupling between the
low- and high-psychopathy groups. During imagine-self perspec-
tive, individuals scoring low on the PCL-R showed a negative
connectivity between the aINS and the hippocampus and the
OFC (Figure 4). In the high psychopathy group, there was only
significant functional connectivity between the aINS and the
right pSTS. During imagine-other perspective, low-psychopathy
participants had significant effective connectivity between the
aINS and posterior cingulate cortex and dlPFC (Figure 5).
In high-scoring participants, negative connectivity was found
between aINS and the right OFC and posterior cingulate
cortex.
Functional connectivity analyses seeded in the right amyg-
dala showed distinct patterns of co-variations depending on the
perspective adopted in controls vs. psychopaths. During imagine-
self perspective, controls exhibited a significant negative coupling
between the amygdala and ventral and mPFC, while participants
with high scores on the PCL-R showed a positive coupling with
the pSTS/TPJ, ventral and mPFC, and dlPFC (Figure 6). During
imagine-other perspective, the reverse pattern of functional con-
nectivity was observed. Low psychopathy was associated with
greater positive coupling with the OFC, whereas the high psy-
chopathy showed a negative coupling with the OFC and dlPFC
(Figure 7).
DISCUSSION
Perspective taking while observing or imagining other’s feelings
has been described as an empathic attentional set that facilitates
other-oriented emotional and motivational responses congru-
ent with the perceived welfare of that person (Van Lange, 2008;
Batson, 2012). To examine the extent to which affective reactions
can be evoked or modulated by perspective taking in individuals
with psychopathy, incarcerated participants with different lev-
els on the PCL-R were scanned while viewing stimuli depicting
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Table 3 | Groupwise results and factor sub-score covariates for imagine-self and imagine-other perspectives.
Region of interest MNI coordinates Peak T Factor 1 Peak T Factor 2 Peak T
x y z x y z x y z
IMAGINE-SELF PERSPECTIVE
Controls > Psychopaths
R Orbitofrontal cortex 14 58 −2 3.28 n.s. 24 54 2 −2.15
L dlPFC −12 52 8 3.40 −16 54 6 −3.12 −14 52 4 −2.44
L Periaqueductal gray 0 −28 −14 3.23 n.s. −4 −24 −14 −3.01
Psychopaths > Controls
R Inferior frontal gyrus 50 26 8 2.65 48 26 10 2.99 52 24 8 2.83
L Anterior midcingulate cortex −4 8 34 2.82 −2 8 30 3.31 n.s.
R Anterior midcingulate cortex 4 10 32 3.01 4 10 30 2.93 6 6 32 3.38
L Supplementary motor area −10 2 50 2.49 −6 2 54 2.37 −8 6 44 3.18
R Anterior insula 38 20 12 2.74 32 14 4 2.03 34 20 8 2.73
R pSTS 44 −48 14 2.41 46 −48 16 2.61 44 −50 18 3.44
IMAGINE-OTHER PERSPECTIVE
Controls > Psychopaths
R Inferior frontal gyrus 44 26 2 2.25 40 30 2 −2.62 38 28 10 −2.59
R Anterior midcingulate cortex 6 18 34 2.21 n.s. 8 16 34 −2.44
R mPFC 16 32 12 3.58 16 32 12 −3.88 12 40 14 −2.67
L Anterior insula −44 14 4 2.25 −44 14 4 −2.48 −44 12 0 −2.21
R Anterior insula 34 30 4 3.07 42 14 2 −2.54 42 10 2 −2.25
L Supplementary motor area −6 16 54 3.04 −8 20 54 −2.3 −8 20 54 −4.14
R Supplementary motor area 8 24 46 2.69 6 26 46 2.13 4 18 52 −2.22
R pSTS 50 −52 22 3.09 50 −52 20 −3.04 52 −50 16 −2.23
R Inferior parietal lobule 44 −32 22 2.99 42 −32 22 −3.14 48 −32 26 −3.13
L Inferior parietal lobule −48 −36 22 2.81 −44 −38 22 −3.19 −46 −38 22 −3.24
R Putamen 30 8 2 3.5 30 8 0 −2.7 30 8 2 −2.77
L Putamen −14 10 −2 2.48 −12 8 0 −2.56 n.s.
Psychopaths > Controls
R dlPFC 28 48 14 3.28 30 48 12 2.33 26 50 14 3.60
L Inferior temporal gyrus −50 −38 −18 2.62 −52 −40 −16 3.52 −52 −40 −14 3.55
R Ventral striatum 10 16 −6 3.55 10 16 −6 3.18 12 16 −4 3.84
Negative and positive peak T-values represent negative and positive relations, respectively. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere. dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus.
bodily injuries and instructed to imagine these situations as either
happening to themselves or to someone else.
At the group level, collapsed across the PCL-R scores (n =
121), both conditions of imagine-self and imagine-other in pain
were associated with signal increase in brain regions implicated in
the perception of pain and distress, when viewing body parts suf-
fering injuries or facial expressions of pain (Jackson et al., 2006;
Lamm et al., 2007, 2011; Decety and Porges, 2011; Bruneau et al.,
2012). In healthy participants, activity in this network, which
includes the aINS, thalamus, aMCC, IFG, and somatosensory cor-
tex, has been interpreted as a form of somatosensory resonance,
or shared neural representations with the pain of others, provid-
ing an implicit intersubjective affective knowledge (Decety and
Jackson, 2004; Singer and Decety, 2011; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012).
However, these vicariously instigated activations of the so-called
“pain matrix” are not specific to the sensory qualities of pain,
but instead are associated with more general survival mechanisms
such as aversion and withdrawal when exposed to danger and
threat (Benuzzi et al., 2008; Decety, 2010). In fact, based on a
systematic review of electroencephalographic and functional MRI
studies that examined neural response triggered by nociceptive
stimuli, activity of this cortical network seems to reflect a system
involved in detecting, processing, and reacting to the occurrence
of salient sensory events regardless of the sensory channel through
which these events are conveyed (Legrain et al., 2011).
Interestingly and quite surprisingly, the hemodynamic
response in aINS and aMCC, regions considered as pivotal in the
affective component of empathy, was highest in high psychopaths
during imagine-self perspective, replicating the results of a recent
study of pain empathy in criminal psychopaths that reported
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FIGURE 1 | Response in the right amygdala across groups of low (L),
medium (M), and high (H) psychopathy (on total PCL-R scores)
participants, when they adopted an imagine-self and an imagine-other
affective perspective while viewing bodily injuries. Groupwise effects
(bars at the bottom of the figure) are expanded to show the contribution of
continuous PCL-R subscores on Factor 1, which encompasses the
emotional/interpersonal features of psychopathy.
FIGURE 2 | Response in the right anterior insula across groups (L, low;
M, medium; H, high on total PCL-R scores) during imagine-self and
imagine-other perspectives in participants viewing bodily injuries.
Groupwise effects seen in (bar graph) are expanded to show the
contribution of Factors 1 and 2 from PCL-R subscores.
greater activation in the insula, which was positively correlated
with scores on both PCL-R factors 1 and 2 (Decety et al., 2013)
(Figure 2). The aINS and aMCC are the two regions that have
beenmost reliably activated in fMRI studies of pain empathy with
healthy subjects (Valentini, 2010; Lamm et al., 2011). This finding
does not support the view that psychopaths do not resonate
when exposed aversive stimuli such as pain, or at least they are
FIGURE 3 | Response in the right ventral striatum in participants
scoring high on the PCL-R (≥30) when they imagined another person
in pain, and correlation with scores on Factor 1.
FIGURE 4 | Functional connectivity analyses, seeded in the anterior
insula in participants with the lowest scores on the PCL-R (≤20) and
participants with the highest scores on the PCL-R (≥30) during
imagine-self perspective.
not totally blunted when they take a first-person perspective.
This finding also raises an interesting question: whether or not
sensorimotor resonance (underpinned by the mirror neuron
system involved in perception-action coupling) is the mecha-
nism that facilitates emotion contagion and empathic arousal.
Psychopaths are characterized by a lack of affective empathy,
but there is little evidence that they show a deficit in sensori-
motor resonance (Blair, 2011; Decety, 2011b). For instance, a
transcranial magnetic stimulation study demonstrated increased
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FIGURE 5 | Functional connectivity analyses, seeded in the anterior
insula in participants with the lowest scores on the PCL-R and
participants with the highest scores on the PCL-R (>30) during
imagine-other perspective.
FIGURE 6 | Functional connectivity analyses, seeded in the right
amygdala in participants with the lowest scores on the PCL-R (≤20)
and participants with the highest scores on the PCL-R (≥30) during
imagine-self perspective.
sensorimotor resonance to painful hand-pricking videos in
college students scoring high on the psychopathic personality
inventory (PPI), as compared to students who score low on the
PPI (Fecteau et al., 2008). Juvenile incarcerated psychopaths
showed greater sensorimotor resonance as measured by EEG
and suppression of the mu rhythm when they viewed visual
stimuli depicting people being physically injured, despite a lack
of affective arousal to the same stimuli as measured by the N120
ERP component (Cheng et al., 2012). Children with aggressive
conduct disorder and psychopathic tendencies and incarcerated
psychopaths exhibit typical (Marsh et al., 2013) or even stronger
activation in the somatosensory cortex than control participants
when they watched scenarios depicting people in pain (Decety
et al., 2009, 2013), all of which does not suggest an impairment
in somatosensory responses to others’ pain. Our finding that
participants scoring high on psychopathy activate the pain
FIGURE 7 | Functional connectivity analyses, seeded in the right
amygdala in participants with the lowest scores on the PCL-R and
participants with the highest scores on the PCL-R (>30) during
imagine-other perspective.
network during imagine-self perspective fits well with studies
showing that individuals with psychopathy may up-regulate
emotional (at least for fear) processing when attention to salient
stimuli is particularly engaged (Newman and Lorenz, 2003), and
this may be the case for pain.
Furthermore, and as expected, the lower the participants
scored on Factors 1 and 2 of the PCL-R, the higher the activ-
ity in the aINS during imaging-other perspective. This indicates
that more vicarious experience was elicited in control partici-
pants when they imagined another in pain, and the opposite
pattern (low activation in the aINS) was found in participants
who scored high on psychopathy. In addition, functional con-
nectivity analyses, seeded in the right aINS during imagine-self
perspective negatively co-varied with activation in the hippocam-
pal gyrus and OFC in control participants (low on psychopathy),
and was positively coupled with the right pSTS region in psy-
chopaths. During imagine-other perspective, the aINS positively
covaried with activity in the right dlPFC and PCC in controls,
and negatively with the OFC and PCC in high psychopaths.
Altogether, the hemodynamic response in the aINS shows distinct
profiles of activation depending on whether participants adopted
an imagine-self or imagine-other perspective taking. These results
from the imagine-other perspective condition support two recent
functional neuroimaging studies in children with conduct dis-
order (Lockwood et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2013). Both studies
reported a reduced response in the aINS and ACC when the chil-
dren viewed pictures of others in pain. Furthermore, a negative
association between callous traits and the aINS/ACC was found.
The fact that individuals with high scores on the PCL-R showed
a reduced response when imagining the pain of another suggests a
specific deficit in affective processing in a region considered as a
critical hub to integrate salient stimuli and events with visceral
and autonomic information (Menon and Uddin, 2010).
Signal change in the right amygdala was detected during
imagine-self perspective in all participants, and during imagine-
other perspective in controls. The hemodynamic response in
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the amygdala was inversely correlated with individual scores on
PCL-R Factor 1 during imagine-other perspective. This is in
line with most neuroimaging studies of psychopathy that docu-
mented reduced amygdala response to fearful and aversive stimuli
(Marsh and Blair, 2008; Harenski et al., 2009). This finding
is consistent with the notion that psychopaths lack the ability
to be responsive to, or aroused by distress cues, and there-
fore are not sensitive to signs of vulnerability. A recent fMRI
study in youths with psychopathic traits also reported reduc-
tion in the amygdala and insula when they imagined physi-
cal injuries to others, but not their own pain (Marsh et al.,
2013).
It is very interesting to note that imagine-self perspective was
associated with activity in the amygdala in psychopaths when
they focus on their own affective reaction. While most stud-
ies report a reduced response in the amygdala in psychopaths,
an fMRI study conducted on a small number psychopaths and
controls found increased activation in the right amygdala in the
psychopath group with respect to controls when viewing neg-
ative IAPS pictures (Müller et al., 2003), indicating that the
role of the amygdala in psychopathy may not be straightfor-
ward, nor its lateralization. A meta-analysis of 67 neuroimaging
studies reported that the lateralization of activation in the amyg-
dala was explained by differences in temporal dynamics and/or
habituation rates, namely a short-duration response in the right
amygdala and a more sustained one in the left (Sergerie et al.,
2008). It is however difficult to interpret the amygdala acti-
vation during imagine-self perspective further without a more
fine-grain analysis of amygdala sub-nuclei and their anatomical
connectivity, which helps determine their function (Saygin et al.,
2011). With this caveat in mind, it is important to note that
functional connectivity analyses, seeded in the right amygdala,
demonstrated very different patterns of connectivity depending
on the perspective taking strategy (imagine-self vs. imagine-
other) and participants (low vs. high psychopaths). The response
in the right amygdala was negatively coupled with activity in
the OFC in controls and positively correlated with the OFC and
dlPFC and pSTS in high psychopathy during imagine-self per-
spective (Figure 3). The exact reverse functional connectivity was
detected during imagine-other perspective (Figure 4). This find-
ing specifically points to amygdala–OFC interactions as being
an important neural mechanism that underlies the outcome of
perspective taking in psychopathy. It seems to indicate that dur-
ing imagine-self perspective, individuals with psychopathy elicit
amygdala-OFC coupling but fail to do so during imagine-other
perspective. Such a failure to recruit the OFC during third-person
perspective taking supports the dysfunction of this neural path-
way in response to distress cues of others in psychopaths. It
has been argued that the integrated functioning of this circuit
enables the basics of care-based morality, and that dysfunction
within these regions in psychopathy means that reinforcement-
based decision making, including moral decision making, and
care base morality is impaired (Blair, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2010; Marsh et al., 2011). One theory of the origin of empathic
deficits in psychopathy is the failure during development to
form stimulus-reinforcement associations connecting harmful or
aggressive actions with the pain and distress of others (Kiehl,
2006; Glenn and Raine, 2009). It is worth mentioning that psy-
chopathic traits are not exclusively associated with amygdala
hyporeactivity. A study that included 200 young adults with
self-reported psychopathy assessment found that amygdala reac-
tivity to fearful facial expressions is negatively associated with the
interpersonal facet of psychopathy, whereas reactivity to angry
expressions is positively associated with the lifestyle facet (Carré
et al., 2013).
Finally, the increase of activity in the ventral striatum dur-
ing imagine-other perspective in psychopaths, which was pre-
dicted by their scores on Factor 1 of the PCL-R, is an intriguing
finding. This could suggest that psychopaths not only experi-
ence blunted vicariously arousal to others’ pain and reduced
feelings of concern when adopting their perspective, but they
may in fact find the distress of others pleasurable or posi-
tively arousing. The ventral striatum is selectively recruited dur-
ing reward anticipation in healthy participants (Diekhof et al.,
2012 for a meta-analysis). In adolescents with conduct disor-
der and psychopathic tendencies, an fMRI study found acti-
vation of the ventral striatum during the perception of pain
in others (Decety et al., 2009). In healthy subjects, the ventral
striatum has been associated with experiencing pleasure at oth-
ers’ misfortune (e.g., Dvash et al., 2010; Cikara et al., 2011). It
has been suggested that neurons in the ventral striatum have
access to central representations of reward and thereby partic-
ipate in the processing of information underlying the motiva-
tional control of goal-directed behavior (Schultz et al., 1992).
Activation of the ventral striatum while imaging another in phys-
ical pain was correlated with PCL-R Factor 1, and not Factor 2.
Abnormalities in the ventral and dorsal striatum are consid-
ered to play a key role in the etiology of psychopathic traits
(Buckholtz et al., 2010; Carré et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
There is general consensus among theorists that the ability
to adopt and entertain the psychological perspective of others
has a number of important consequences, including empathic
concern (e.g., Blair, 2007; Batson, 2009; Decety and Svetlova,
2012). Adopting the perspective of another is a powerful way
to place oneself in the situation or emotional state of that
person (Batson, 2011). Our results demonstrate that while
individuals with psychopathy exhibited a strong response in
pain-affective brain regions when taking an imagine-self per-
spective, they failed to recruit the neural circuits that are
were activated in controls during an imagine-other perspec-
tive, and that may contribute to lack of empathic concern.
Finally, this atypical pattern of activation and effective con-
nectivity associated with perspective taking manipulations may
inform intervention programs in a domain where therapeu-
tic pessimism is more the rule than the exception (Salekin,
2002). Altered connectivity may constitute novel therapeutic
targets for interventions. Both cognitive and pharmacotherapy
interventions may restore connectivity patterns (Crocker et al.,
2013). Imagining oneself in pain or in distress may trigger a
stronger affective reaction than imagining what another per-
son would feel, and this could be used with some psychopaths
in cognitive-behavior therapies as a kick-starting technique
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 489 | 9
Decety et al. Affective perspective taking in individuals with psychopathy
for eliciting emotional tagging of different outcomes of
interpersonal situations.
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